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Abstract: We derive empirical predictions from the standard investment-cash flow 
framework on the functioning of internal capital markets (ICM), but circumvent its 
criticism by focusing on parent cash flow and investment opportunities. We test these 
predictions using a unique data set of parent firms and their listed and unlisted subsidiaries 
in 90 countries over the period 1995-2006. We find that company and country institutional 
structures matter. (1) Ownership participation of the parent firm in the subsidiary plays a 
crucial role for the proper functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership stake of the 
parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. (2) The best functioning cross-border ICMs 
can be found in the sub-sample of firms with parents from a country with “strong” 
institutions and subsidiaries from a country with “weak” institutions. (3) Unlisted 
subsidiaries are much more dependent on the ICMs their parents provide than listed 
subsidiaries. Thus, ICMs are not per se “bright” or “dark”, their proper functioning depends 
on how they are set up. 
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1. Introduction  
The literature stresses two opposing effects of internal capital markets (ICMs) on 
the investment performance of group firms or group segments. On the one hand, ICMs may 
substitute for missing external capital markets (ECMs), especially in less developed 
countries (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Desai, Foley and Hines, 
2003). In the presence of capital market imperfections, subsidiaries/segments are able to 
access the funds that parents provide (Inderst and Mueller, 2003), and they benefit from the 
access to finance from other affiliates within the multinational network (Stein, 2003). 
Parents may also impose discipline on subsidiaries/segments by reallocating funds to those 
with investment proposals with a positive net present value but low internal cash flows 
(Stein, 2002). On the other hand, the redistribution of capital between subsidiaries or 
segments may weaken managerial incentives and lead to wasteful business activities 
(Milgrom and Roberts (1988); Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Under the conditions 
of soft budget constraints, ICMs allocate too many resources to firms with bad investment 
opportunities and too few to firms with good investment opportunities (Lamont, 1997; Shin 
and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). Some authors explain ICM 
inefficiency by poor corporate governance (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, 2000; Sautner and 
Villalonga, 2008; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). Others claim that the evidence of ICM 
misallocations is an artifact of measurement error in Tobin’s q used as a proxy for 
investment opportunities (Whited, 2001).  
We take a neutral view and analyze the factors which contribute to the proper or ill-
functioning of internal capital markets. Our empirical analysis builds on the familiar 
asymmetric information hypotheses on the relationship between internally generated cash 
flows and company investment (see e.g. Stein (2002) or Gugler et al. (2004)). We extend 
this investment-cash flow framework to derive testable hypotheses on the workings of 
ICMs. We show that in proper functioning ICMs the subsidiary investment is positively 
related to parent firm cash flow and negatively related to parent firm investment 
opportunities.  
We construct a unique data set of parent firms and their listed and unlisted 
subsidiaries in 90 countries over the period 1995-2006. The cross country/cross firm 
variation in our dataset allows us to test various novel hypotheses on the effects of the 
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nature of the parent-subsidiary relation (tightness of control, relatedness of assets etc.), 
country governance, and financial development on the functioning of ICMs. We seek to 
contribute to the literature on ICMs in at least three ways.  
First, most papers on ICMs use firm segment data that introduce measurement 
errors in the main variables. For example, one cannot directly measure investment 
opportunities by Tobin’s q because divisions have no independent market value, thus 
papers typically use the q-ratios of stand-alone firms in the same industry as a proxy for 
division’s investment opportunities. This approach was criticized on the grounds that 
average qs of stand-alone firms do not proxy well for the investment opportunities of 
divisions (Whited, 2001). Some authors try to resolve the problem of measurement errors 
constructing a measurement-error consistent estimator (Whited, 2001) or using plant-level 
data (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002). Our paper uses subsidiary data. Subsidiaries are 
separate legal entities and provide balance sheet and income statements. Thus, we do not 
need to rely on segment data and can directly control for the investment opportunities of the 
subsidiaries, e.g. measured by (subsidiary) Tobin’s q or sales growth. 
Second, a large literature has examined the link between internally generated cash 
flows and company investment, interpreting the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a sign 
of financial constraints. For example, Bond et al (2003) study the role of financial factors in 
investment spending in four countries in Western Europe and present evidence that 
financial constraints are relatively severe in the more market-oriented U.K. financial 
system. Love (2003) examines cash flow coefficients across countries and tests whether 
they vary with measures of financial development. Recently, Becker and Sivadasany (2010) 
focus on the effects of financial development on company financing constraints in 
European countries over the period 1998-2002. Both papers find that financial development 
can mitigate financial constraints. 
This literature was criticized on the grounds that cash flow may merely proxy for 
future investment opportunities, and thus a positive investment-cash flow coefficient does 
not say much about cash constraints (see the discussion between Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) 
and Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000). This paper partly circumvents this critique by 
focusing on the parent firm cash flow influence on subsidiary investment. Parent cash 
flows should be less likely to proxy for subsidiary investment opportunities. Moreover, we 
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systematically utilize the cross country/cross firm/cross time nature of our panel, and stress 
the differences across firms and countries. Large and significant parent cash flow 
coefficients found in ICMs for some firms or countries and insignificant cash flow 
coefficients found for others are a sign of the workings/non-workings of the ICMs and not 
differing investment opportunities.
1
 
Finally, in recent years a great deal of research focused on the role of institutions in 
determining company performance. It demonstrated that there are significant differences in 
performance across firms that are related to the corporate governance and legal institutions 
of the country in which a company is located, the identity of the controllers of a firm, and 
the degree of entrenchment of those in control.
2
 We add significantly to this evolving 
literature by testing for the effects of institutional structures on ICMs. 
Our study is related to a recent paper by Carlin, Charlton and Mayer (2008), who 
examine the effects of ownership and financial development on investment behaviour in 69 
countries in 1994-2005. We analyse simultaneously listed and unlisted subsidiaries of 
(listed) parents. Carlin, Charlton and Mayer (2008) focus on listed subsidiaries only and 
present evidence in favour of the existence of ICMs that reallocate finance to member firms 
with superior investment opportunities. However, unlisted subsidiaries far outweigh listed 
subsidiaries in economic importance and presumably, one of the main reasons why ICMs 
exist is to substitute for missing ECMs. Unlisted subsidiaries are more likely to face cash 
constraints, and should benefit most from the workings of ICMs. We discuss the 
similarities to and differences from Carlin, Charlton and Mayer (2008) more in depth in the 
body of the text. 
We find mixed evidence for the functioning of ICMs. On the one hand, we find 
evidence that ICMs alleviate cash constraints if ECMs are under-developed. Parent firms 
do re-allocate cash flows, and the subsidiaries with better investment opportunities get a 
higher share of the pie (i.e. there is a “ranking” of subsidiaries competing for valuable 
funds). Investment of unlisted subsidiaries is much more sensitive to parent firm cash flow 
than the investment of their listed counterparts. Subsidiaries from "weak" institution 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the discussion in Bond et al (2003). 
2
  See e.g. La Porta et al. (1997, 2000a, 2000b), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (1998), Faccio, Lang and Young (2001), Claessens et al. (2002), Gugler et al. (2003, 2004a, 
2008), Gugler and Peev (2010), Mueller et al. (2003), Mueller and Peev (2007). 
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countries or from countries with badly developed financial markets, are more dependent on 
ICMs than their counterparts in "strong" institution countries or countries with well 
developed financial markets. All this is consistent with the "bright side" of ICMs. 
On the other hand, ICMs are “costly” in the sense that a large ownership stake of 
the parent is an important factor for their working. Moreover, it appears to be necessary that 
the parent firm stems from a country with strong institutions and/or ECMs for proper 
functioning ICMs. If the parent stems from a “weak” country, one should not expect 
functioning ICMs. Thus, there is also a "dark side" of ICMs. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our hypotheses 
and the econometric modeling. Section 3 describes the data and sample characteristics. 
Section 4 analyzes the econometric results and Section 5 provides conclusions.   
 
2. Hypotheses on internal capital markets 
2.1. The inner workings of internal capital markets 
The Modigliani & Miller (1958) approach to corporate finance when extended to 
FDI would imply that ownership and country institutional structures are irrelevant for 
investment decisions.
3
 In figure 1, with perfect capital markets, the supply of funds, S , is a 
horizontal line at r , the risk-adjusted market rate of interest. Internal and external funds are 
perfect substitutes. The demand for capital investment is assumed downward sloping. In the 
neoclassical theory, a firm's investment depends only on this demand and its cost of capital, 
and is independent of the size of its cash flow. A neoclassical firm invests where the 
expected marginal profitability of investment equals its marginal cost. 
In contradiction to the neoclassical theory, imperfect external capital markets and 
corporate governance problems are major determinants of investment behaviour.
4 
If the 
firm faces a rising cost of capital schedule once it enters the external capital market e.g. due 
to transaction costs or asymmetric information,
5
 the supply of capital, S, is dependent on 
                                                 
3
 See also Miller (1988). 
4
 See e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Stein (2003), Gugler et al. (2004b), Degryse and 
Jong (2006), and Gugler and Peev (2010). 
5
 Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that firms may be cash-constrained because outside investors have 
less information than the owner-managers about the true value of assets or investment opportunities. 
Cash-constrained managers maximize incumbent shareholder wealth by foregoing some positive 
NPV projects rather than issuing equity which is currently undervalued due to asymmetric 
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the level of cash flows. Figure 1 depicts a subsidiary (on the left part of the figure), which 
has good investment opportunities but a steeply upward sloping external cost of funds 
schedule, and a parent (to the right), which is much larger and is also depicted as having an 
upward sloping external cost of funds schedule.
6
 If ICMs work perfectly, the parent firm 
uses own cash flow and available external funds and redistributes them to the subsidiary 
until risk adjusted returns across both firms (or more generally across all firms in the group) 
are equalized, i.e. until rS = rP. It follows that the subsidiary can profitably invest more in the 
ICM, ISa ICM, than as a stand alone firm, ISa , and the parent invests less.
7
 
Figure 2 depicts the effects of an increase in parent cash flows, shifting its cost of 
funds schedule to the right. Not surprisingly, by alleviating the group’s cash constraints, 
this shift increases both subsidiary and parent investment, if the ICM works smoothly. 
Smooth functioning of ICMs also implies that the parent firm allocates its funds 
across subsidiaries depending on the relative value of each subsidiary’s investment 
opportunities. Thus, increasing investment opportunities of the parent firm (or more 
generally, the entire group except the particular subsidiary) will decrease the subsidiary’s 
investment, holding the subsidiary’s investment opportunities constant. In Figure 3, we 
analyze this situation as a shift of the parent demand for capital schedule to the right. The 
parent invests more and the subsidiary less after this shift (given the budget constraint of 
the group). 
In sum, proper functioning ICMs imply that the investment of subsidiaries is 
positively affected by the cash flows of the parent firm and negatively affected by the 
investment opportunities of the parent firm. 
  
                                                                                                                                                    
information. Adverse selection can also lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Uncollateralized credit could be denied to firms if adverse selection of loan applicants leads banks 
to choose an interest rate at which the market does not clear. See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988) for the first empirical tests. 
6
 For the basic argument of redistribution of funds to the subsidiary with better projects it does not 
matter whether the parent has also a rising cost of capital schedule or not.  
7
  If the parent has a flat cost of capital schedule, its investment would not be affected by the ICM 
and it would remain at I
P*
. 
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2.2. Determinants of the functioning of ICMs 
The functioning of ICMs may differ according to (1) the tightness of the internal 
incentive and control structure between parent and subsidiary, and (2) the external 
constraints faced by the parent and the subsidiary. 
Regarding (1), the ownership stake of the parent in the subsidiary determines the 
financial interest/incentive the parent has in funding profitable investment opportunities of 
the subsidiary as well as its ability to control the operations of the subsidiary (e.g. via 
management selection, supervisory board representation and the like). In fact figures 1-3 
were drawn under the assumption that the parent has a 100% ownership stake in the 
subsidiary. Only in this case should we expect full equalization of risk-adjusted marginal 
returns on investment across group firms. If the parent had, e.g., only a 50% stake in the 
subsidiary, it might prefer a lower marginal return project conducted internally, where it 
gets all of the benefits, to a higher marginal return project conducted by the subsidiary, 
where it only gets 50% of the returns. There are also a number of legal and tax reasons to 
expect that ICMs work better the larger the ownership stake of the parent, and in particular 
when it is 100%. E.g. wholly owned subsidiaries are tax advantaged in their dividend 
payments in the US and many other countries as opposed to partially owned subsidiaries, in 
partially owned subsidiaries minority shareholder rights might complicate ICMs.
8
 Thus, the 
functioning of ICMs depends on the parent firm’s ownership stake in the subsidiary: the 
larger this stake, the better the ICM should function. Thus, we have: 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the parent stake, the larger the parent's cash flow effect, and the 
more negative the parent's investment opportunities effect.  
Regarding (2), external constraints, country level factors, such as the legal system, 
law enforcement, corruption, and the development of external capital markets, co-
determine on the one hand how easy it is to set up functioning ICMs for the parent and on 
the other hand how easy it is for the subsidiary to raise capital externally (either external 
debt or equity) and therefore the value of ICMs. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) sparked a huge 
literature in law and finance analyzing country effects worldwide. These studies emphasize 
the importance of a country’s legal institutions in protecting shareholders improving 
company investment performance and external capital market development. Other studies 
                                                 
8
 See also Samphantharak (2006). 
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focus on the quality of country governance and argue that companies have better 
investment performance in countries with strong property rights enforcement, independent 
judiciaries, and strong contract enforcement.
9
 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) present 
evidence on the importance of the protection of property rights in explaining differences in 
the sizes of external capital markets and GDP per capita. However, there are few studies 
analyzing the influence of country factors on the workings of ICMs in a cross-country 
setting.
10
  
High quality governance institutions in a country should increase company 
investment performance by reducing the transaction costs of writing and enforcing 
contracts, of obtaining licenses and permits, and more generally of conforming to the laws 
and regulations of the country. Some of the benefits a parent company obtains from 
operating in a country with high quality institutions might be passed on to its subsidiaries.  
For example, good institutions in a parent’s country may lower the transaction costs of 
writing and enforcing contracts with its subsidiaries.  Good institutions in a parent’s 
country may facilitate the transfer of technology, know how, and good management 
practices to subsidiaries. Cash constraints are then lower and more profitable investment 
projects can be financed by the subsidiary using the internal capital market. Thus, ICMs 
may function better, if the parent operates in a country with a good institutional 
environment. 
We expect that when parent firms stem from countries with high institutional 
quality and developed ECMs, they can provide better monitoring and finance profitable 
investment opportunities. On the other hand, subsidiaries in countries with high 
institutional and/or ECM development may not need ICMs to finance their investment but 
can obtain funding from functioning ECMs, while subsidiaries in countries with low 
                                                 
9
 See e.g. Besley (1995) and Johnson et al. (2002). Previous research presents evidence on the 
positive association between protection of shareholder rights and property rights, on the one hand, 
and the size of the external capital market, on the other hand. However, separating the effects of 
legal institutions and the quality of country governance on performance is a difficult task. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), for example, discuss the difficulty in constructing pure “property 
rights” measures, and show that one of their proxies for property rights institutions in fact 
incorporates information closely related to legal institutions.  
10
 See e.g. Carlin, Charlton and Mayer (2008). 
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institutional quality need ICMs as substitutes for the lack of developed ECMs.
11
 Thus, we 
expect 
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of the parent's cash flow and the negative effect of the 
parent's investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are stronger for subsidiaries in 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets and parent firms from countries with 
developed financial markets than for subsidiaries from countries with other parent-
subsidiary pairs. 
Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of the parent's cash flow and the negative effect of the 
parent's investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are stronger for subsidiaries in 
countries with “weak” country governance and financial systems and parent firms from 
“strong” systems than for subsidiaries from countries with other parent-subsidiary pairs. 
Whether the subsidiary is listed or not can be categorized as lying in between 
internal and external constraints. Listing entails a dispersion of ownership, so listed firms 
move away from the wholly owned subsidiary. Listing on a stock exchange also means 
minority shareholder rights and much stricter transparency. The legal form of a listed 
subsidiary usually is a joint stock corporation, which gives it much more autonomy in 
decision making vis a vis the parent (e.g. it is not bound by directives). Thus, we expect a 
much looser relation between parents and listed subsidiaries than between parents and 
unlisted subsidiaries. Moreover, listing may also affect the external constraints faced by the 
subsidiary: Listed subsidiaries do not need ICMs as much as unlisted subsidiaries do, since 
ECMs substitute for them. It is very likely that the asymmetry of information for listed 
subsidiaries is much lower than for unlisted subsidiaries: their shares are traded daily on the 
stock exchange, they are covered by a number of analysts, they provide quarterly company 
reports, and they are on average much larger than their unlisted counterparts. Moreover, 
unlisted firms have not gone to the stock exchange in the first place, because, presumably, 
asymmetry of information is particularly severe for them so that under-pricing of assets 
would occur. Thus, we expect that ICMs play a larger role for unlisted subsidiaries than for 
listed subsidiaries.  
                                                 
11
 Rossi and Volpin (2004) examine the interaction effects of the institutional quality of countries of 
acquirer and target firms in their study on determinants of cross-country mergers and acquisitions.    
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Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of the parent's cash flow and the negative effect of the 
parent's investment opportunities on subsidiary investment are stronger for unlisted 
subsidiaries than for listed subsidiaries. 
 
2.3. Econometric Modeling  
We test these predictions by estimating accelerator models of investment 
augmenting them with subsidiary and parent cash flow and parent Tobin’s q terms similar 
to those used by Shin and Stulz (1998), Chevalier (2004), and Carlin, Charlton and Mayer 
(2008): 
1 1 1st st s st p pt p pt s st p pt s stI I SG SG Q CF CF                    (1)
 
 Whereby, Ist is the investment of the subsidiary in time t divided by beginning of 
year total assets; Ist-1 is the lagged investment rate; SGst is the sales growth rate of the 
subsidiary from t-1 to t; SGpt is the sales growth rate of the parent; CFst-1 is the cash flow of 
the subsidiary in t-1 divided by total assets, and CFpt-1 is the cash flow of the parent in t-1 
divided by total assets, Qpt reflects the Tobin’s q of the parent in t, and the s  denote 
(subsidiary) firm fixed effects. We measure investment as the change in fixed assets plus 
depreciation, cash flow as the net profit/loss of a firm plus depreciation, Tobin’s q as 
market capitalization plus long term debt over total assets, and sales growth as the log 
difference between sales from one period to the next. 
 The coefficients of main interest are p  
and p . A negative p  implies a ranking of 
subsidiaries, such that if the investment opportunities of the whole group go up relative to 
the investment opportunities of the subsidiary s, the investment of the subsidiary should go 
down, since funds are redistributed within the group. A positive p  implies that parent 
funds are used to finance subsidiary investment.  
 The problems in measuring investment opportunities are well known. Studies 
usually apply Tobin’s q (defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement costs of the firm’s capital stock). However, Tobin’s q reflects expected returns 
on investment only if the firm is a price taker in competitive markets, there are constant 
returns to scale and the stock market value of the firm correctly measures the fundamental 
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expected present value of the firm’s future net cash flows (Hayashi, 1982). There are also 
problems to measure the replacement costs of assets due to the lack of disclosure 
requirements in most European countries (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). Theoretically, 
marginal q should be used as the proxy of present and expected future investment 
opportunities but since marginal q is unobservable, most studies use average q as a proxy. 
 Since the largest part of our sample consists of unlisted subsidiaries for which we 
cannot control for investment opportunities via subsidiary Tobin’s q, we have to be very 
careful controlling for investment opportunities. Equation (1) therefore includes a number 
of variables controlling for them. First, lagged investment controls for possible dynamic 
effects and adjustment processes in the investment behavior of the subsidiary. The sales 
growth rates are included to control for accelerator effects on investment, which may also 
originate in the parent company. Subsidiary cash flow controls for investment 
opportunities, if current (own) cash flow proxies for investment opportunities. Finally, we 
include subsidiary firm fixed effects controlling for time invariant investment opportunities. 
For the sub-sample of listed subsidiaries we can and do control for investment opportunities 
by including (also) subsidiary Tobin’s q. 
 We measure parent’s cash flows and sales subtracting the subsidiary’s values, 
however, we cannot apply the same procedure to parent’s q, since most subsidiaries are not 
listed. We do not, however, expect any negative relationship between subsidiary investment 
and parent’s q to be driven by this mis-measurement. First, parent firms are much larger 
than subsidiaries on average, thus any mis-measurement is likely to be minor (see Table 2). 
Second, and more importantly, if we include part of the subsidiary’s investment 
opportunities in our parent q measure, its coefficient should be biased upward. Thus, if we 
find a negative relation between subsidiary investment and parent q, the true relation should 
be even more negative. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, the literature is concerned that the interpretation 
of cash flow coefficients may be ambiguous, if cash flows proxy for future investment 
opportunities (see the discussion between Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997, 2000)). We focus on the parent firm cash flow influence on subsidiary 
investment, which should be less likely to proxy for subsidiary investment opportunities. 
Moreover, we carry out a cross-country study and to the extent that the link between current 
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cash flows and future investment opportunities is similar across countries, one may argue 
that large and significant country differences in the parent cash flow coefficients are likely 
to proxy for differences in the workings of ICMs across countries. 
3. Data 
We construct a unique dataset containing data from three databases, Amadeus and 
Osiris, provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing and Worldscope by Thompson 
Reuters. Bureau von Dijk and Thompson Reuters combine several information sources, like 
company registers, annual reports, stock exchanges etc., to establish a corporate database.  
Amadeus and Osiris assign unique identification numbers to each company.  Using this 
identification key, it was possible to interlink the two databases. Amadeus contains 
ownership and financial firm-level data for mainly unlisted companies from 38 European 
countries, while Osiris contains ownership and financial firm-level data for listed 
companies for around 120 countries. We use the ownership structure provided by Osiris 
and add financial data for unlisted subsidiaries from Amadeus, and so construct a panel 
using both databases for the years 1995-2006. Additionally we link the Worldscope 
database using the isin code for listed firms to augment missing values in the dataset.
12
 
Thus, we are able to identify listed parent firms, listed and unlisted subsidiaries. 
 We evaluate the quality of country governance using the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. We average the six indexes: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, 
(5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. The indicators are constructed using the 
unobserved components methodology described in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2005). The indicators are measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance. 
 We measure the financial development of a country by the ratio of private credit 
lent by deposit money banks to GDP. We think that this measure most accurately reflects 
the external constraints faced by most of our firms, since bank credit is the most important 
source of external funds and most of our firms are unlisted. Alternatively, one may measure 
                                                 
12
 Osiris and Worldscope have similar information regarding financial variables for listed 
firms. Detailed information regarding the match between the two databases is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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external financial market development by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(see Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2000). Since results are similar we report only the 
first set of results. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by countries. For any country we present the 
number of listed and unlisted subsidiaries, number of parent firms and the country average 
institutional quality index and financial market indicators. Subsidiaries are defined as firms 
when the parent is (at least) a majority owner, i.e. where the parent holds more than 50% of 
the equity. On average, parent firms have around six subsidiaries, around 4% of all 
subsidiaries are listed, a bit more than half of all subsidiaries are foreign. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables by parent firms, listed 
and unlisted subsidiaries. On average, the investment ratio is higher for listed than unlisted 
subsidiaries. Internally generated cash flow is 7.4 % of assets in listed, 7% in unlisted 
subsidiaries, and 6.6% in parent firms. While average sales growth is smaller for parent 
firms than for either type of subsidiary, parents’ average Tobin’s q is larger than for listed 
subsidiaries. Parents are on average around 25 times as large as their unlisted subsidiaries 
(in terms of number of employees) and three times as large as their listed subsidiaries. 
Parents on average hold around 2/3 of the equity in listed, and 90% in unlisted subsidiaries. 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1. Main results on internal capital markets 
Equation (1) includes a lagged dependent variable as well as firm fixed effects, 
additionally, we cannot exclude possible endogeneity between the left and some right hand 
side variables (e.g. reverse causality between investment and cash flow). Therefore, 
estimation by OLS would give us biased estimates. We address these issues by applying the 
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM model estimates equation (1) 
using the systems GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator eliminates (subsidiary) firm 
fixed effects by first-differencing as well as controls for possible endogeneity of current 
explanatory variables. Endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be valid 
 14 
instruments provided that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
idiosyncratic error terms.
13
 
Table 3 displays our main results. We include only subsidiaries where the parent 
firm owns more than 50% of the equity, so these are “true” subsidiaries and they are 
consolidated with the parent firm. We further distinguish between listed and unlisted 
subsidiaries. In the regressions, we can include 22,503 unlisted subsidiaries controlled by 
3,262 parent firms (70,262 observations) and 736 listed subsidiaries controlled by 330 
parent firms (3,095 observations), respectively. The Sargan tests do not suggest rejection of 
the over-identifying restrictions at conventional levels. While there is evidence of first 
order serial correlation in the residuals, the AR(2) test statistics reveal absence of second 
order serial correlation in the first differenced errors. Our GMM estimates therefore use 
variables lagged by three or more periods as instruments. 
The coefficients on the control variables are reasonable. The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable is positive and significant for unlisted subsidiaries, indicating 
dynamic adjustment processes of investment. The accelerator terms are all positive and two 
out of four are significant indicating important accelerator effects. 
 Turning to our variables of main interest, parent cash flow displays a positive, 
sizeable, and significant coefficient for unlisted subsidiaries pointing to a financial relation 
between them and their parents. Moreover, parent Tobin’s q has a negative and significant 
coefficient: the larger the investment opportunities of the parent firm, the lower the 
investment rate of the unlisted subsidiary. Both coefficients together imply that funds for 
investment are redistributed within the group, and this redistribution of funds is responsive 
to investment opportunities. We do not find significant effects for listed subsidiaries. The 
larger coefficient of parent cash flow for unlisted subsidiaries (0.264) compared to listed 
subsidiaries (0.010) and the more negative Tobin’s q effect (-0.028 versus -0.011) imply 
that ICMs are – as expected in hypothesis 4– much more important for unlisted than for 
listed subsidiaries.  
 In sum, we do find that ICMs are at work for unlisted subsidiaries. Parent cash 
flows positively affect subsidiary investment and parents “rank” their subsidiaries 
                                                 
13
 Of course, it would be preferable to use a set of truly independent instrumental variables (IV) 
instead. It was, however, impossible for us to identify and collect a set of IVs that varies across 
firms and time and that is uniformly valid for all countries in the sample. 
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according to investment opportunities in the face of an overall group capital budget 
constraint. 
 
4.2. Tightness of control and internal capital markets 
Table 4 analyzes whether the size of the equity stake of the parent firm matters. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the larger the percentage holdings of the parent in the subsidiary, 
the better the ICM works, since fewer incentive and control (and legal and tax) problems 
arise. The extreme case is a 100% owned subsidiary: the residual claimant (i.e. the parent) 
gets all the benefits and bears all the costs of its actions (e.g. funding and monitoring), so 
there is no corporate governance problem. The table presents regressions again for unlisted 
and listed firms using interaction terms of parent Tobin’s q and the cash flow terms (as well 
as subsidiary Tobin’s for listed firms) with parent ownership stake. This specification 
assumes a continuous and linear relation. Note, that we include all firms, i.e. also those 
firms where the parent has an ownership stake of less than 50%. While one may not call 
them “subsidiaries” but rather equity participations, we do this deliberately because we 
want to test whether an ICM exists for minority controlled firms at all, or to put it 
differently, we want to determine the thresholds of ownership when ICMs start to work. 
The results are striking. The interaction term of parent ownership and parent cash 
flow is significantly positive in the unlisted sub-sample: The larger the equity interest of the 
parent in the unlisted subsidiary, the more parent cash flow is used for funding subsidiary 
investment. The impact of parent cash flow is always positive and significant for unlisted 
subsidiaries, and reaches its maximum of around 0.3 for wholly owned subsidiaries. In 
contrast, the effect of parent cash flow is insignificant for listed firms. Moreover, the 
interaction term of parent q and ownership stake has the right sign (negative) but is 
insignificant for unlisted firms. We again do not find such an effect for listed subsidiaries. 
In sum, our results are consistent with agency theory, in that the efficiency of the 
ICM crucially depends on the incentives and the control means of the parent. The larger its 
equity interest in the subsidiary, the tighter the ICM and the better it functions. This 
confirms hypothesis 1. It also implies that proper functioning ICMs are “costly” in the 
sense that the parent must have a sizeable stake in the subsidiary. 
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We now turn to country determinants of the workings of ICMs. Hypotheses 2 and 3 
essentially stated that firms operate under a set of constraints depending on the quality of 
country institutions and the development of ECMs, and therefore the workings of ICMs 
should differ accordingly. In particular, we hypothesized that both parent and subsidiary 
country institutions and/or ECMs matter. Parent firms in countries with “good” 
institutions/ECMs decide on better investment projects and are more capable of monitoring 
their investments, subsidiaries in “bad” countries are more in need of ICMs. In contrast, 
parents from “bad” countries probably also do bad investments, and subsidiaries in “good” 
countries have ECMs and are not so much in need of parent funds. Thus, ICMs should 
work “best” if the parent stems from a “good” country and the subsidiary stems from a 
“bad” country. We conduct two sets of tests for the effects of the quality of country 
institutions/ECMs on the workings of ICMs. First, we test for the influence of financial 
market development. Second, we use the overall World Bank Index of country governance 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). Since our tests involve a four way 
split of the sample, we were not able to sensibly estimate the quite data demanding GMM 
methodology for listed subsidiaries. Thus, we report only the results for unlisted 
subsidiaries. 
 
4.3. Financial market development and internal capital markets 
 As hypothesis 2 predicted table 5 confirms that the best functioning ICMs are found 
in the sub-sample “strong/weak” (parent firms from countries with private credit to GDP 
ratio above the median value of 1.016; subsidiaries from countries with private credit to 
GDP ratio below the median). The parent cash flow coefficient is largest ( 0.16) in this sub-
sample of subsidiaries where the parent company comes from a country with a well-
developed ECM, and subsidiaries coming from less well developed ECMs. Moreover, the 
“ranking” of subsidiaries according to investment opportunities is most pronounced in this 
sub-sample. Subsidiaries in countries with better functioning ECMs are less dependent on 
ICMs. As already mentioned, results using stock market capitalization as discriminatory 
device are similar. 
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4.4. Quality of country governance and internal capital markets 
Table 6 uses the average WGI index of the World Bank to differentiate among four 
sub-samples, namely: (1) quality of both parent and subsidiary country governance and 
financial system is “strong”, (2) quality of parent governance and financial system is 
“strong” and of subsidiary financial system “weak”, (3) quality of parent governance and 
financial system is “weak” and of subsidiary governance and financial system “strong”, and 
(4) quality of both parent and subsidiary governance and financial system is “weak”. 
Countries are separated on the basis of whether the WGI index is larger or smaller than one. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that ICMs are most relevant in case (2), where the parent 
system is strong, thus the parent should be able to fund profitable investments and exert 
monitoring, but where the subsidiary system is weak, thus the subsidiary needs an ICM 
because of a lack of good ECMs. We indeed get the strongest results in the (2) subsample 
"strong/weak" in so far as the parent cash flow coefficient is largest (0.26) and significant, 
and parent Tobin’s q is significantly negative. ICMs appear to break down when the parent 
company stems from a “weak” institution country. 
 To summarize, our results using the most commonly used direct measures of 
financial market development accord well with the results using the World Bank WGI 
index of institutional development. One common picture emerging from these results is that 
ICMs become more important (1) the better the system of the parent company, thus the 
parent must be able to perform financing and monitoring functions and (2) the worse the 
system of the subsidiary country, thus the subsidiary must need these financing and 
monitoring functions. If the parent stems from a “weak” country, one should not expect 
functioning ICMs. 
 
4.5. Additional Robustness Checks and Comparison to Carlin et al. (2008) 
4.5.1. Horizontal versus non-horizontal subsidiaries 
The GMM methodology already controls for a number of econometric problems in 
the estimation of equation (1), such as consistent estimation in the presence of both a 
lagged dependent variable and firm fixed effects as well as consistent estimation in the 
presence of endogeneity. One may however still criticize our approach on the grounds that 
parent cash flow may proxy for group wide investment opportunities and thus also for 
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subsidiary investment opportunities, and thus that our estimated positive effect is not 
identifying parent fund transfers but simply investment opportunities of the subsidiary.
14
 If 
so, however, we would expect this to be the case predominantly for horizontal subsidiaries 
and less so for non-horizontal subsidiaries. 
Table 7 reports estimates of our basic equation for the sub-samples of horizontal 
(parent and subsidiary operate in the same 4-digit industry) and non-horizontal (parent and 
subsidiary operate in different 4-digit industries) subsidiaries.  Around 40% of subsidiaries 
are horizontal subsidiaries, 60% are non-horizontal. Additionally, we split by stock 
exchange listing. For unlisted subsidiaries, while the coefficient on parent cash flow is 
larger for horizontal subsidiaries, it remains positive and significant for non-horizontal 
subsidiaries. This is reassuring and it is an indicator that the parent cash flow coefficient 
does not pick up (unlisted) subsidiary investment opportunities, but measures the workings 
of the ICM. 
 
4.5.2. Comparison to Carlin et al. (2008) 
 Since Carlin et al. (2008) is close in spirit to our paper and since some of our results 
are similar but others differ markedly, it is justified to take a closer look at the possible 
reasons for the differences. Carlin et al. (2008) obtain a negative effect of parent Tobin’s q 
on subsidiary investment, and this association is stronger when (1) parent ownership is 
lower, (2) the geographic distance between subsidiary and parent is greater, or (3) the 
differences between the financial development of the subsidiary and parent countries are 
smaller. In what follows we compare our results on (1) and (3) to Carlin et al. (2008), we 
do not analyze (2), geographic distance. 
 Ad (1): We also get a negative effect of parent Tobin’s q, so it appears a robust 
finding of the two papers that multinationals rank their subsidiaries according to investment 
opportunities and ICMs fund accordingly. For the listed sub-sample, we also get a positive 
interaction term of parent Tobin’s q and parent ownership, and a negative interaction term 
                                                 
14
 Note, that we do not have this potential problem with parent Tobin’s q, since the hypothesized 
coefficient is negative. If we get a negative coefficient of parent Tobin’s q, we can be sure that this 
measures a ranking of subsidiaries within the group. If parent Tobin’s q would predominantly proxy 
for group wide investment opportunities and therefore also for subsidiary firm investment 
opportunities, we would expect a positive coefficient. 
 19 
of parent cash flow and parent ownership although our coefficients are insignificant. Thus 
for listed firms our results match with Carlin et al. (2008). 
 For unlisted subsidiaries, however, our results differ. We get a significantly negative 
interaction term of parent Tobin’s q and parent ownership. We interpret this as being 
consistent with the theory that in closer ICMs the parent has more incentives and means to 
distribute funds according to investment opportunities. Carlin et al. (2008), however, only 
analyze listed subsidiaries. Our explanation is further strengthened by the positive 
coefficients of the interaction terms of parent ownership and cash flow for unlisted firms. 
Carlin et al. (2008) get a negative coefficient (for listed subsidiaries). But why should a 
parent distribute less cash if its ownership stake increases? After all, as explained in the 
theory section, the tighter the relation between parent and subsidiary the more is the parent 
the residual claimant of investment decisions (funding, monitoring). The extreme case is a 
wholly owned subsidiary where parent and subsidiary funds should be perfect substitutes. 
Thus, it appears that listed and unlisted firms are fundamentally different at least what 
concerns the functioning of ICMs.  
 Ad (3): Concerning financial market development, Carlin et al. (2008) find that the 
negative effect of parent Tobin’s q on subsidiary investment is stronger if the differences 
between the financial development of the subsidiary and parent countries are smaller, 
moreover if these differences get smaller, the parent cash flow effect also diminishes. We 
find potentially different results, the two sets of results cannot, however, be directly 
compared. First, the methods are not directly comparable. Carlin et al. (2008) use 
interaction terms, we estimate in the four sub-samples “strong/weak”, “strong/strong”, 
“weak/weak”, and “weak/strong” on good theoretical grounds, see above. Second, the 
variable used by Carlin et al. (2008), i.e. the ratio of the private credit to GDP ratio of the 
subsidiary divided by the parent country ratio is problematic. An increase in this ratio 
indicates a smaller difference in financial market development only if the parent company 
starts out with a better developed market. If the subsidiary has the better system to start 
with, an increase of this index indicates even more difference. We realize that this may not 
be a large problem in the sample used by Carlin et al. (2008), since most of their parents 
stem from countries with high financial development (see their Table 10), however in our 
sample this would be a problem. Third, and probably more relevant, the variable used by 
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Carlin et al. (2008) cannot accommodate our four way classification. We explicitly 
hypothesize that ICMs function best when the parent stems from a good system and the 
subsidiary stems from a bad system, since the parent is then capable of setting up a good 
ICM and the subsidiary needs it. This is not possible with the Carlin et al. (2008) measure. 
For example, their measure would take on similar values for our categories “strong/strong” 
and “weak/weak” (two strong countries with say 130% private credit to GDP ratio would 
get a ratio of one, however also two weak countries with say 50% get a ratio of one).  
 To summarize, several of our results match with Carlin et al. (2008), the most 
important one is that multinationals rank their subsidiaries according to investment 
opportunities. Other results differ, most importantly our results on the tightness of control. 
The most plausible explanation is a different construction of the sample, in particular that 
we also analyze unlisted firms. The results on financial market development cannot be 
directly compared, since we use a different – in our view more appropriate – empirical 
strategy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, for a unique cross-country panel of firms, we systematically collect 
evidence for the inner workings of internal capital markets. Subsidiaries are separate legal 
entities and provide balance sheet and income statement data, which obviates the need to 
rely on segment or imputed data, and thus allows to directly control for the investment 
opportunities of the subsidiary. Moreover, by focusing on parent cash flows, we avoid 
many of the problems that plague the interpretation of conventional investment-cash flow 
regressions.  
We show that parent firms are involved in cash flow re-allocation activities and that 
subsidiaries with better investment opportunities get a larger share of the pie. We find (1) 
compelling evidence for the hypothesis that the tightness of control of the parent firm in the 
subsidiary plays a crucial role for the smooth functioning of ICMs. The larger the 
ownership stake of the parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. The ownership stake 
of the parent must be quite substantial for ICMs to work properly. (2) Unlisted subsidiaries 
make much more use of ICMs than listed subsidiaries. Apparently better access to external 
capital markets diminishes the importance of internal capital markets. (3) The country 
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institutional environment matters. Using a number of indicators for country governance and 
financial development, we find that the best functioning ICMs can be found in the sub-
sample of firms with parents from countries with high institutional development or well 
developed ECMs and subsidiaries from countries with low institutional development or 
badly developed ECMs.  
 This paper sheds some light on the discussion of whether ICMs are "bright" or 
"dark". Our answer is "it depends". ICMs are not a priori good or bad, their proper 
functioning depends on the internal control structure between parent and subsidiary and on 
the external constraints the two types of firms face.  
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